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Abstract: This paper presents an empirical examination of individuals’ motivations 
for multiple-job holding or moonlighting.  Theoretical models of moonlighting 
suggest that individuals to hold a second job for either financial reasons (they face 
hours-constraints in their first job) or non-pecuniary motives (heterogeneous jobs). 
We assess the relative importance of these reasons using a purposefully collected 
stated preference data set. We find that individuals respond to financial constraints by 
having multiple-jobs, but these financial motives are not sufficient to explain 
moonlighting. We also find that individuals are attracted to the non-pecuniary aspects 
of the second jobs, such as job satisfaction and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that second job holding may be a hedging strategy 
against job insecurity in the primary job. Our empirical results contribute to a better 
understanding of this labour market behaviour. 
JEL classification: J22  
Keywords: Multiple-job holding; discrete choice experiment 
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WHAT TRIGGERS MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING?  
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Increased labour market flexibility is one of several changes to European economies 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Harrison, 1998).  This increased 
labour market flexibility has been accompanied by an increase in multiple job-
holding: There is a substantial, and growing, proportion of workers in the UK who 
hold a second job. Between 1984 and 2001 the number of people with a second job 
increased by 68%; while the number of people in employment increased by 18%. 
Multiple job-holding or moonlighting1 is a labour supply strategy that can ensure 
uninterrupted employment spells and provide higher earnings to individuals compared 
to working in one job. Since 1995 more than 1.2 million people in the UK have had 
multiple jobs at some time (Labour Force Survey, Office of National Statistics). This 
equates to between 8 and 10% of the UK labour market (Böheim and Taylor, 2004).  
Furthermore, over the last year, the average time an individual spends working in their 
second job has increased by 2.7% to 9.8 hours per week. 
 
The labour economics literature suggests that individuals choose to work in more than 
one job for two reasons: they are hours constrained in their primary job; and they seek 
heterogeneous jobs.  The first motivation posits that an individual may be constrained 
in the number of hours that he can work in his primary job and consequently this 
limits his earnings capacity from that job.  In response to the employer’s inability to 
offer him enough hours on the primary job, the individual may choose to take a 
second job to achieve his desired income level (Conway and Kimmel, 1998). The 
                                                 
1 The term “moonlighting” is used liberally to refer to multiple-job holding, without making any 
implications regarding the legitimacy or the time the described actions take place. 
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second, heterogeneous jobs, motivation recognises that the hours of labour supplied to 
the two jobs may not be perfect substitutes.  Individuals may choose to work in a 
second job for reasons that are not connected to primary job’s hours of work or 
earnings (Kimmel and Conway, 2001; Böheim and Taylor, 2004).  For instance, an 
individual may have a second job to learn about new occupations or gain training in a 
new field with the aim of starting a primary or sole job in this field in the future; to 
engage in activities of interest to them; to gain job satisfaction not received from the 
primary job; or to maintain flexible work schedules 
 
The individual’s reason for holding a second job influences both the determination of 
wages and hours of work, and has implications for the length time an individual will 
hold a second job.  There has been to date, however, very little empirical analysis of 
what motivates individuals to moonlight.  This is primarily due to the lack of data 
suitable for answering this question.  While most large micro datasets ask respondents 
whether they have a second job, none of these datasets explicitly gather information 
on why individuals choose to hold more than one job.  Furthermore, large micro 
datasets predominantly focus on revealed preference data, and thus can only report 
second job characteristics for individuals who moonlight. However, there are three 
reasons why an individual does not moonlight, and while it is not possible, using 
revealed preference data, to distinguish between these reasons they each imply 
different individual labour supply decisions: (1) Individuals are not interested in 
moonlighting, (2) Individuals would like to moonlight but they can not find a second 
job with attractive features, and (3) Individuals would like to moonlight but they 
cannot find employment.  There are two possible reasons why one individual cannot 
find employment in a second job and another individual can.  First, observed 
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moonlighters may be more informed or more engaged in the job market, which allows 
them to identify job opportunities, or they could be more aggressive in their job 
search.  Second, multiple-job holding is the outcome of a two-step process: an 
individual queues for a second job, and the employer hires the individual from a pool 
of applicants.  This implies that moonlighters and non moonlighters may also differ in 
their attractiveness to employers. 
 
We add to the literature on multiple job holding by investigating what triggers 
moonlighting behaviour.  To do this we focus on the individual’s decision to 
moonlight and relate this to characteristics of the primary job and second job using a 
form of conjoint analysis, a discrete choice experiment.  This, stated preference 
method, elicits individuals preferences for different multiple job combinations.  This 
approach allows us to investigate the relative importance of competing theoretical 
explanations for moonlighting. Section 1 presents the theoretical background of 
moonlighting and reviews empirical studies on multiple-job holding. Section 2 
discusses methods of data collection, Section 3 presents and discusses the results and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Theory and Literature 
The standard theoretical framework assumes that an individual’s labour supply 
decisions on both the primary and secondary jobs are based on utility-maximising 
behaviour.  An hours-constrained worker does not work sufficient hours on his 
primary job to reach the level of income that optimises his utility.  For the hours-
constrained worker, primary job hours are no longer a choice variable, and the only 
avenue for working more hours is to take a second job (Conway and Kimmel, 1998).  
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The hours-constrained moonlighter is illustrated in Figure 1.  The total amount of 
time available is denoted by T, and H1 represents the maximum number of hours the 
individual can work in his primary job.  Whether the individual chooses to take a 
second job in order to increase his utility and income will depend on the second job 
wage.  If the wage on the second job exceeds the reservation wage (determined by the 
utility level (I1) given at the intersection of the primary job wage and the allowable 
hours H1; Heineck and Scharze, 2004), the hours-constrained individual will take the 
second job.  The hours-constrained worker then chooses to supply H2 hours to the 
second job (resulting in an increase in utility). 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The case of a moonlighter who is not constrained in his primary job hours is depicted 
in Figure 2.  In this case the wage on the second job is assumed to be higher than the 
primary job wage2. An individual who does not face an hours constraint on his 
primary job can work any number of hours that fall in the given working time span T–
H1.  An individual who wishes to work more hours will always choose to work the 
additional hours on the second job rather then working more than H1 hours on the 
primary job at the lower wage.  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
                                                 
2 Although individuals may be attracted to the second job due to its non-pecuniary characteristics, it is 
not possible in this static framework to picture the decision of a non-constrained multiple-job jobholder 
whose wage rate on the second job is lower than that on the prime job (Heineck and Scharze, 2004). 
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Early empirical research investigating moonlighting primarily focused on the hours 
constrained motivation.  The first theoretical and empirical treatment of moonlighting 
was carried out by Shisko and Rostker (1976) who found that the supply of labour to a 
second job fell with primary job earnings.  Hamel (1967) similarly finds that the level 
of a worker’s earnings determines his propensity to moonlight, and as the level of 
earnings rises the incidence of moonlighting declines.  Guthrie (1969) investigates 
moonlighting among teachers in the U.S., and finds evidence that moonlighting serves 
primarily to improve living standards.  Krishnan (1990) also finds that longer hours 
and higher income on the primary job deters multiple-job holding, adding further 
support to the hours constraints motive for moonlighting.  
 
More recent research has investigated alternative moonlighting motives.  For instance, 
the dynamics of moonlighting are investigated by Kimmel and Conway (2001) for the 
U.S. and Böheim and Taylor (2004) for Great Britain. They find evidence for multiple 
motives for moonlighting, with the hours constraint motive being the most common.  
Böheim and Taylor find that moonlighting is persistent over time and conclude that 
hours constraints is unsatisfactory as an explanation for moonlighting. Patterns of 
mobility into and out of second jobs over time are examined by Paxson and 
Sicherman (1996), who conclude that moonlighting is a dynamic process with most 
workers experiencing moonlighting at some point in their working lives, and that the 
hours constraints explanation for moonlighting fails to account for the fact that over 
time workers can avoid hours constraints by searching for new jobs.  Bell et al. (1997) 
investigate if moonlighting acts as a “hedge” against unemployment, but little 
evidence is found to support this motive for having a second job.  Evidence from 
transition economies suggests that moonlighting is likely to be transitory and 
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correlated with future job mobility.  Guariglia and Kim (2006) find that moonlighting 
is transitory and generally associated with career shifts.  Further, Panos, Pouliakas and 
Zangelidis (2009) find that moonlighting may facilitate job transition, and act as a 
stepping stone towards new primary jobs, particularly self-employment.  
 
 
2. The data 
We use a survey to collect data on working conditions and moonlighting behaviour 
from individuals who are employed in the U.K. North Sea oil and gas industry3.  We 
focus on the UK North Sea oil and gas industry because of its unique working time 
arrangements and our expectation that moonlighting motivations may vary across 
individuals.  Offshore oil work is characterised by constrained working hours, regular 
long periods of onshore time (during which they are not working in their primary job), 
and high wages.  The European Union working time regulations that came into force 
in 2003 impose a time constraint on offshore employees who are not able to freely 
adjust their working hours,4 and consequently offshore employees are labour-income 
constrained in their primary job5.  We investigate the labour supply responses of these 
offshore workers to this constraint; specifically, do offshore workers respond to a 
labour-income constraint on their primary job by taking a second job? On the other 
hand, offshore jobs tend to be well-paid jobs.  As a result, individuals may have two 
jobs not for financial reasons, or due to their hours-constraint, but for other non-
                                                 
3 The U.K. oil and gas industry plays a considerable role in the U.K.’s labour market by providing 
480,000 jobs to individuals across the U.K., including 100,000 highly skilled jobs in Scotland. 
4 Individuals may agree to work more than 48 hours per week, but the maximum number of working 
hours allowed over a 52 week period is 2304. 
5 On average individuals in the sample appear to work 15 consecutive days offshore, followed by a 15 
days onshore break. 
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pecuniary reasons.  While our analysis is confined to the U.K. North Sea oil and gas 
industry, our study is relevant to other industries and occupations with similar 
working time arrangements:  for example, the fisheries sector or occupations that are 
characterised by shift work (such as firemen).  For an investigation of multiple job 
holding within the fisheries sector, see Dickey and Theodossiou (2006). 
 
Data was collected using self-completed questionnaires.  The questionnaires were 
distributed, through the offshore installation managers (OIMS) of 152 different UK 
North Sea offshore installations6, to a random sample of 760 offshore workers in 
January 2007. Data collection took place over three months and 330 completed 
questionnaires were returned by the OIMs.  This represents a 43% response rate.  The 
questionnaire collected information about the personal characteristics and job 
characteristics of the respondents.  Respondents were asked if they held a second job, 
and information was gathered on the occupation, employment status, hours of work 
and wages of the second job. 
 
We investigate individual’s decision to moonlight and relate this to characteristics of 
the primary job and second job using a form of conjoint analysis, a discrete choice 
experiment. This methodology originated in marketing research and has been applied 
to transportation research, and in environmental and health economics to elicit 
preferences for non-market goods (Kanninen, 2007).  Discrete choice experiments are 
based on Lancaster’s theory of value (Lancaster, 1966), and can be used to estimate 
the trade-offs that individuals make between the dimensions of goods and services. 
 
                                                 
6 This represents approximately 96% of all the UK North Sea offshore installations. 
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The first stage in designing a discrete choice experiment is the definition of the 
attributes or characteristics of the good or service.  We define the good as an 
employment package consisting of a primary job and a potential second job. The 
characteristics of both the primary and the secondary job are selected to cover the 
range of possible moonlighting motivations suggested by the theoretical literature and 
to be realistic representations of the choices that offshore workers may face. We 
describe the primary job using four characteristics; job security (temporary contract 
―lasting less than 12 months, fixed term contract ―lasting between one and three 
years, and permanent contract), job safety (low risk of work related accidents, 
medium risk of work related accidents, high risk of work related accidents), working 
time (two-weeks onshore and two weeks offshore, three weeks onshore and two 
weeks offshore), household income (not enough to cover regular expenses, just 
enought to cover regular expenses, enough to cover regular expenses and have some 
savings). The second job is described using four characteristics; type of second job 
(self-employed, part-time employee, full-time employee), job satisfaction (a job you 
enjoy, doesn’t offer any particular satisfaction), entrepreneurial activities (gain 
experience to start a new career, not gain experience to start a new career), wages 
(£300, £600, £900, £1200, £1500, £1800 per onshore period). 
 
Job security is included as a characteristic to test if individuals hold a second job as a 
hedging strategy against unemployment. Two characteristics of the primary job 
working time and household income, and one characteristic of the second job wages 
in the second job are used to capture hours constraints/financial motives for multiple-
job holding. Three characteristics of the second job, the type of second job, the 
perceived job satisfaction and the opportunity for entrepreneurial activities reflect 
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heterogeneous jobs motives. Job safety in the primary job is included to test if 
individuals in jobs with high risk of accidents may get a second job as a “way out” of 
their primary job (the heterogeneous jobs argument).  
 
The characteristics of the primary job and second job are combined to define a 
primary plus second job employment ‘package’.  This package is presented to 
respondents in the questionnaire, and respondents are asked to imagine that they are 
employed in the primary offshore job specified and then state if they would take the 
second job as described.  Figure 3 provides an example of a choice.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
In the questionnaire respondents were asked to complete a series of choices.  To select 
the job packages to present in the questionnaire we used experimental design theory 
(Cox, 1958).  In total the discrete choice experiment includes eight job characteristics.  
A full factorial combination of these characteristics and their levels results in 3,888 
primary and potential second job packages.  To select the sample from the set of all 
possible combinations we used an orthogonal main effects plan (Sloane – website).  
This reduced the number of combinations to 36.  Due to the possibility of respondent 
fatigue, this was more combinations than we wanted to include in one questionnaire.  
Thus, we split the 36 packages into two sets of 18 packages.  To assign the packages 
to one of the two sets we added an additional two level variable to the experimental 
design.  By assigning packages to each of two sets in this way we ensured that 
attribute levels were balanced and orthogonal both within and across sets (Hensher et 
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al., 2006).  Thus, there were two versions of the questionnaire and in each version 
respondents were asked to complete 18 choices7.   
 
2.1 Analysis of the discrete choice experiment 
Analysis of discrete choice experiment data is based on random utility theory (RUT) 
(McFadden, 1973).  Accordingly, we assume that the individual knows his 
preferences with certainty, but these preferences contain elements that are 
unobservable by the researcher and thus are treated as stochastic.  Individual n, has an 
indirect utility function for job package i, that is composed of two additive parts, a 
systematic (observable) component Vin, and a stochastic (unobservable) component εin  
where, 
 
Uin = Vin + εin 
 
We assume that respondents will take a second job when Uin is positive. The 
systematic component of utility is described by a vector xin that contains the eight 
primary and second job characteristics defined above.  The systematic component of 
the indirect utility function specified is assumed to be linear-in-parameters.  (By using 
an orthogonal main effects plan to select the profiles included in the DCE we can 
identify the main effect of each characteristic, but interaction terms between 
characteristics are confounded.)  By assuming the stochastic component, inε , is 
independent and identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1, a logit model is 
used for estimation.  The behaviour being modelled is respondents’ probability of 
                                                 
7 The complete set of 36 hypothetical choices is available from the authors upon request. 
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stating they would take the second job.  The probability that respondent, n, chooses to 
moonlight in alternative i is: 
 
( ) 1
1 inn i x
P moonlight
e β ′−
= +  
 
The model above assumes that the parameters β are the same for all respondents i.e. 
respondents on average have the same preferences.  However, it is likely that different 
respondents will have different preferences.  This preference heterogeneity can be 
incorporated into the model using a random parameters logit model (Train, 2001).  
The random parameters model assumes that  
 
in n in inU xβ ε′= +  
 
where βn is a vector of coefficients for individual n representing the individual’s 
tastes.  The coefficients can vary across the population with density f(β), and the 
individual knows his own βn and εin. I f βn were known to the researcher then the 
probability of respondent n choosing alternative i would be a logit conditional on βn.  
As this is not the case, the unconditional choice probability is the integral over all 
possible values of βn.  
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The random parameters logit model also considers the sequence of respondents’ 
choices, thus avoiding the restrictive assumption of the logit model that several 
choices made by the same individual are independent.  In this case, the coefficients 
are assumed to vary over respondents but are constant for all choices made by the 
same respondent.  To estimate the random parameters logit, the researcher must first 
specify a distribution for each of the random coefficients, and the mean and standard 
deviation of the coefficients are estimated.  Most applications of the random 
parameters logit to date have specified f(β) as normal or log-normal. 
 
3. Results 
Of the 330 respondents to the questionnaire, 312 respondents were male.  Given the 
low number of female respondents we focus the analysis of the discrete choice 
experiments on male respondents.  Table 1 reports demographic and job 
characteristics for the sample of male respondents, and for moonlighters and non-
moonlighters separately.  The statistical significance of the mean differences across 
the two groups is provided in the last column.  The profile of the average respondent 
is that of a male worker, aged 44, who is married or co-habitats and has a child. 
[Table 1] 
The incidence of moonlighting among oil and gas workers in our sample is 7.4%, 
which is representative of the national average (Böheim and Taylor, 2004).  
Moonlighters tend to be slightly younger than non-moonlighters and are less likely to 
be married, although the number of children living in the household is marginally 
higher.  The comparison of moonlighters and non-moonlighters highlights differences 
that are consistent with the financial motive for multiple job holding.  Moonlighters 
have lower average earnings from their primary job.  Furthermore, 43% of non-
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moonlighters stated they were living comfortably, but only 26% of moonlighters 
chose this category to describe their financial situation, and a higher proportion of 
moonlighters than non-moonlighters stated they were “finding it very difficult” 
financially.  When asked about their preference over the number of hours they work 
on their primary job, 2% of non-moonlighters wanted to spend more days working 
offshore compared to 13% of moonlighters.   
 
 
3.1 Results of the discrete choice experiment 
In the discrete choice experiment respondents were asked a series of 18 choices, 
resulting in a panel dataset of 5,940 observations.  Table 2, column 3 reports the 
results of the logit model.  All attributes included in the discrete choice experiment 
(except for income from the second job) are categorical and thus are coded as dummy 
variables.  Ceteris paribus, there is a disinclination to moonlight, as indicated by the 
statistically significant negative constant term.  All job characteristics included in the 
discrete choice experiment have a statistically significant effect on the probability that 
a respondent would state he was willing to moonlight, except working time.  Thus, 
respondents would moonlight to overcome financial constraints which they may face, 
but financial motives are not sufficient to explain this labour market behaviour:  
Heterogeneous-jobs motives are also important in the decision to hold a second job. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Working on a temporary contract (lasting less than 12 months) relative to a fixed term 
contract (lasting between 1-3 years) in the primary job significantly increased the 
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probability of moonlighting, suggesting that individuals would get a second job as a 
way to insure against job insecurity.  Relative to a primary job with low risk of injury, 
a primary job with a high risk of injury increased the probability of moonlighting.  
 
Relative to household income from the primary job ‘not being enough’, household 
income levels of ‘just enough’ and ‘more than enough’ had a negative effect on the 
probability of moonlighting: this is evidence of the financial motives behind 
moonlighting.  Relative to a full-time second job, a part-time second job and a self-
employed second job both increased the probability of moonlighting.  A finding that 
may be interpreted as evidence that individuals may hold a second job in order to 
maintain flexible work schedules.  
 
Respondents were more likely to state that they would moonlight if the second job 
provided job satisfaction, and similarly if the second job offered an opportunity to 
learn skills to start their own business.  The earnings from the second job had a 
positive effect on respondents’ probability of stating they would moonlight.  
 
In the mixed logit model, all coefficients except earnings from the second job, and the 
constant were specified as random.  There were no strong a-priori reasons to restrict 
the sign of the coefficients to be either positive or negative, thus normal distributions 
were specified for all variables.  The constant term is fixed (not specified as random) 
to aid model identification.  We use the results of the model to calculate the marginal 
rates of substitution between a change in attribute levels and earnings from the second 
job.  Thus, the coefficient of the earning attribute is fixed, to aid the calculation of 
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these marginal rates of substitution (Train, 2001).  Simulation was performed using 
2000 Halton draws. Table 2, column 4 reports the results of the mixed logit model.   
 
Compared to the logit model, the mixed logit model has improved model fit, indicated 
by the lower (absolute) value of the log likelihood at maximisation and lower value of 
the Akaike Information Criteria.  The parameter estimates from the logit and mixed 
logit are not directly comparable because parameter estimates and model variances are 
confound in discrete choice models.  For all attributes the standard deviation is 
significant at the 1% level; this indicates that preferences vary in the sample.  With 
respect to the primary and second job characteristics which were statistically 
significant in the logit model the results are qualitatively the same.  Consider the 
attributes that were not significant in the logit model (permanent contract, medium 
risk, and working time), in the mixed logit model the mean is not significant but the 
standard deviation is significant.  This implies that within the sample these variables 
have opposing effects on respondents’ probability to moonlight.  
 
The estimated means and standard deviations indicate the share of the population that 
place a positive or negative value on job attributes8 (Table 3).  Consider the 
distribution of the estimated coefficient for part-time (compared to full-time) second 
job, the estimated mean is 0.389 and the estimated standard deviation is 1.078, thus 
                                                 
8 The mean and the standard deviation of the normally distributed parameter are obtained from the 
estimates. These are then converted to a standard normal distribution, by dividing the mean estimate by 
the standard deviation estimate resulting in z, this gives the equivalent point for the mean in a standard 
normal distribution. Given the standard normal distribution has mean 0 and is symmetric, one can 
calculate the amount of the distribution between 0 and z and add this to or subtract this from 0.5 
(depending on the sign of the coefficient) to determine the proportion of the parameter distribution that 
is positive and negative. 
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64% of the distribution is positive and 36% of the distribution is negative.  This 
implies that a part-time second job preferred to a full time second job for about two 
thirds of the sample and one third of the sample would prefer a full-time to a part-time 
second job.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
The ratio of the first job characteristics coefficient to the second job earnings 
coefficient is a measure of the amount of monetary compensation required in the 
second job to make respondents’ utility equivalent to the base category for that 
attribute. The marginal rates of substitution for the mixed logit9 are presented in 
Table 4. For instance, to compensate workers for a temporary contract compared to a 
fixed contract, an individual needs to earn £260 more from their second job, ceteris 
paribus. Similarly the ratio of the second job characteristics coefficient to the second 
job earnings coefficient is a measure of respondents’ willingness to pay for these 
characteristics compared to the base category for that attribute. All other things equal, 
respondents are willing to pay £413 in order to be self-employed in their second job. 
In other words being self-employed, compared to being a full-time employee, in the 
second job is equivalent to earning £413 more from that job. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
We calculated the marginal rates of substitution to eliminate scale parameter confound 
found in binary choice models and to present the coefficients into a meaningful 
                                                 
9 This is the authors’ preferred estimate. The marginal rates of substitution based on the logit model are 
also available upon request. 
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metric. In considering the results one should focus on the relative, rather than the 
absolute, magnitude. The absolute magnitude may be inflated by two factors. First, 
the sample is drawn from a high-paid sector and thus respondents may have a lower 
marginal utility of income than the population. Second, studies have indicated that 
stated preference studies are prone to hypothetical bias (List and Gallet, 2001; 
Blumenschien et al, 2008). Two studies have empirically investigated the 
correspondence between hypothetical and real valuations elicited using discrete 
choice experiments and these give conflicting results. Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) 
find no significant differences in donations to an environmental charity. Lusk and 
Schroeder (2004) find significant differences in the probability of purchase for 
certified beef steaks. However, they find no significant difference in marginal rates of 
substitution. More evidence exists for the comparison of hypothetical and actual 
valuations obtained using the contingent valuation stated preference method. These 
studies typically report higher valuations when questions asked are hypothetical rather 
than real (Liljas and Blumenschein, 2000; List and Gallet, 2001). This evidence 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the marginal rates of substitution calculated 
from the discrete choice experiment. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our paper contributes to the largely unexplored issue of why individuals hold multiple 
jobs. Theoretical models of moonlighting suggest there are two reasons for 
individuals to hold a second job: financial motives (hours-constraints) and non-
pecuniary motives (heterogeneous jobs). We assess the relative importance of these 
motives using a discrete choice experiment. We investigate this using purposefully 
collected data from offshore oil workers. While individuals respond to financial 
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constraints by moonlighting, financial motives alone are not sufficient to explain 
multiple-job holding.  Respondents are attracted to the non-pecuniary characteristics 
of the second job. We find evidence that moonlighting may be a hedging strategy 
against job insecurity in the primary job. Further, the flexibility of the work schedule, 
the perceived level of job satisfaction from the secondary employment, and the 
entrepreneurial opportunities are also important determinants of individuals’ decision 
to hold a second job. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of this labour 
market behaviour and demonstrate the usefulness of purposefully collecting data to 
investigate labour market phenomenon that are not adequately covered by existing 
large scale panel datasets. 
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Figure1: Utility maximising hours-constrained moonlighter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Utility maximising non hours-constrained moonlighter 
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Figure 3: Example of a primary and second job package, and the choice that 
respondents were asked to make 
Current job characteristics and 
financial situation 
 
Second job characteristics 
• Fixed-term contract (lasting 
between 1 and 3 years) 
 
• You would be full time (usually more 
than 30 hours per month) 
• High risk of work related accidents • The job would not offer you any 
particular satisfaction 
 
• You spend 2 weeks offshore and 3 
weeks onshore 
 
• You would gain experience to help 
you start a new career, or build up a 
new business outside the oil industry 
 
• The household income is just 
enough to cover regular household 
needs  
 
• The usual monthly take home earnings 
are £300 
 
If your current job and financial situation were as described on the left hand side 
above, would you take up the second job described? 
 
{ {
yes no 
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Table 1: Demographic and job characteristics for male only sample 
 All Moonlighters Non-moonlighters 
Test 
Pr(|T|>|t|)
Individual & household characteristics 
Average age (years) 44.2 42.1 44.4  
Household size 3.0 3.3 3.0  
Married/living together 84% 83% 84%  
No. of children in household 0.76 0.91 0.75  
No. of contributors to household  
income 1.7 1.7 1.7  
Education 
Up to secondary school education 23% 22% 24%  
Diploma/Vocational qualifications 60% 57% 60%  
University degree 11% 13% 10%  
Postgraduate degree  4% 9% 4%  
Annual household income 
Less than £15,000 1% 4% 0% ** 
£15,000‐£19,999  1% 0% 1%  
£20,000‐£24,999  3% 4% 2%  
£25,000‐£29,999  14% 30% 13% ** 
£30,000‐£39,999  20% 13% 20%  
£40,000‐£49,999  18% 9% 19%  
£50,000‐£59,999  42% 35% 43%  
Financial Situation 
Living comfortably  42% 26% 43%  
Doing alright  44% 57% 43%  
Just about getting by  12% 13% 12%  
Finding it quite difficult 1% 0% 1%  
Finding it very difficult 1% 4% 1% * 
Primary job 
Monthly net pay  3096.5 2719.4 3124.1 * 
Hours worked per day  13.0 13.0 13.0  
Days worked per month  15.1 15.5 15.1  
25 
Temporary contract  4% 9% 3%  
Fixed contract  7% 4% 8%  
Permanent contract  89% 87% 89%  
Preference over work hrs: more 0.03 0.13 0.02 *** 
Preference over work hrs: same 0.27 0.17 0.28  
Preference over work hrs: less 0.70 0.70 0.70  
Second job 
More than one job 7.4% 100% n.a.  
Earnings from second job on a 
typical offshore break 621.7 621.7 n.a. 
 
Hours on second job (per offshore 
break)  31.9 31.9 n.a. 
 
Self employed 61% 61% n.a.  
Related to primary job 35% 35% n.a.  
No. of observations 312 23 289  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Results of discrete choice experiment for logit model and random 
parameters logit model 
Attribute Level 
Logit  Random parameters logit 
Coefficient
(SE)   
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(SE) 
Type of 
contracta Permanent 
0.341 
(0.072)   
0.088 
(0.115) 
0.912 
(0157)*** 
 Temporary 0.137 (0.073)*   
0.260 
(0.111)** 
0.0586 
(0.218)*** 
       
Job safetyb Medium risk 0.015 (0.072)   
0.098 
(0.114) 
0.947 
(0.157)*** 
 High risk 0.178 (0.073)**   
0.319 
(0.122)*** 
0.938 
(0.167)*** 
       
Working time  -0.022 (0.059)   
0.003 
(0.099) 
0.868 
(0.119)*** 
       
Household 
incomec Just enough 
-0.783 
(0.072)***   
-1.254 
(0.131)*** 
1.147 
(0.149)*** 
 More than enough 
-1.395 
(0.075)***   
-2.231 
(0.132)*** 
0.961 
(0.156)*** 
       
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 0.166 (0.074)**   
0.389 
(0.121)*** 
1.078 
(0.157)*** 
 Self-employed 
0.221 
(0.072)***   
0.413 
(0.111)*** 
0.826 
(0.162)*** 
       
2nd Job 
satisfactione  
0.749 
(0.062)***   
1.311 
(0.119)*** 
1.175 
(0.133)*** 
       
Entreprenurial 
activitiesf  
0.597 
(0.059)***   
0.979 
(0.117)*** 
1.319 
(0.136)*** 
       
2nd job monthly 
earnings  
0.001 
(0.000)***   
0.001 
(0.000)***  
       
Constant  -1.339 (0.120)***   
-2.451 
(0.181)***  
Log (l)  -3341.83   -2901.86  
N  5577   5577  
Akaike Information Criterion 6709.66   5851.72  
Notes: a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted level: Low risk; c omitted level: not enough 
income; d omitted level: Full-time employment; e omitted level: doesn’t offer any particular 
satisfaction; f omitted level: will not gain experience to start new career; g omitted level: no formal 
qualifications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Proportion of sample population with positive/negative coefficient for 
each job characteristic based on the random parameter logit estimates 
 
Attribute Level Positive Negative 
Type of contracta Permanent 50 50 
 Temporary 50 50 
Job safetyb Medium risk 50 50 
 High risk 64 36 
Working time  50 50 
Household incomec Just enough 13.8 86.2 
 More than enough 1 99 
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 64 36 
 Self-employed 69 31 
2nd Job satisfactione  86.6 13.4 
Entrepreneurial activitiesf  77.1 22.9 
Notes: a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted level: Low risk; c omitted level: not enough 
income; d omitted level: Full-time employment; e omitted level: doesn’t offer any particular 
satisfaction; f omitted level: will not gain experience to start new career; g omitted level: no formal 
qualifications. 
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Table 4: Marginal rates of substitution calculated using the random parameter 
logit estimates 
 
Attribute Level Mean (£ per month) 
Type of contracta Permanent . 
 Temporary 260 
Job securityb Medium risk . 
 High risk 319 
Working time  . 
Household incomec Just enough 1254 
 More than enough 2231 
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 389 
 Self-employed 413 
2nd Job satisfactione  1311 
Entrepreneurial activitiesf  979 
Constant  2451 
Notes: a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted level: Low risk; c omitted level: not enough 
income; d omitted level: Full-time employment; e omitted level: doesn’t offer any particular 
satisfaction; f omitted level: will not gain experience to start new career; g omitted level: no formal 
qualifications. 
 
